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INTRODUCTION
The era of big government has thrust sharply into focus the matter of business
ethics in transactions between public authorities and those with whom they deal.
Open corruption in the federal government has never been condoned by the Ameri-
can public, but the ethics of individual officials have not always been scrutinized as
closely as they are today. As government has grown more and more pervasive,
standards of conduct for public officials have been pushed ever upward until they
now stand at an all time high.
Bribery, and some aspects of dealing in favor of self, have long been outlawed,
but it is only recently that legislative and regulatory actions have been taken to strike
at some of the more subtle and pernicious aspects of conflict of interest in public
office.
Conflict of interest will here be defined as any act or position taken by a public
official that places or appears to place the fair and unbiased administration of his
public office in substantial conflict with his personal economic interests The view
is commonly accepted that if the conduct of a public office can sufficiently affect the
private economic interests of a government official, his administration of the office
for the public good will inevitably be influenced to an unacceptable degree by this
conflict between obligation to the public and desire for personal profit. The con-
clusion necessarily drawn then is that personal economic interests must be separated
from the conduct of public office to a sufficient extent so that undue conflict will not
occur. It is the purpose of conflict of interest statutes and regulations to erect the
barriers needed to achieve this separation.
Bribery of a government official is such a flagrant violation of public trust that
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it was understandably the first aspect of conflict of interest to be positively outlawed.2
Modern concepts of conflict of interest in public office are generally considered to
include these additional acts and situations: (a) active participation in any specific
governmental action that Will substantially affect the personal economic interests of
the acting official. The most obvious example of this would be the award of a public
contract to a business concern in which the awarding official owns a controlling in-
terest. More subtle but equally effective would be the exertion of pressure on a
prime contractor to subcontract with a concern in which the government official
holds a stock interest; (b) special assistance to private persons in their dealings with
the government in such a way that an unfair advantage might be given to those
assisted or some economic gain might accrue to the government official involved.
The prosecution by a government attorney of a claim asserted against the govern-
ment by a private party is the typical example of this violation. One of the earliest
statutes dealing with conflict of interest was aimed specifically at curbing this
abuse; 4 (c) acceptance by a public official of something having economic value
from a private person under circumstances that might impair the fair and objective
performance of his official duties. The most obvious target of this injunction is pure
bribery. The giving of gifts, however, is now considered equally violative of this
prohibition. In fact, the sensitivity to this aspect of conflict has now become so well
developed that the bestowal of any gratuity that even has the appearance of impair-
ing the objectivity of official action falls within its scope; (d) former public officials
should be precluded from assisting private persons with respect to any transactions
in which such an official played an active or substantial role while with the govern-
ment. This problem is analogous to the favoritism abuse discussed in (b) above
except that here the assistance occurs after the official has left his government posi-
tion and pertains to matters over which he exercised a substantial degree of control
while holding public office. Post-employment restraints need be imposed only long
enough to nullify the unfair advantage resulting from inside information or close
personal relationships possessed by the former official. Control of this abuse would
lessen the incentive to "pirate" employees from the government for limited purposes;
(e) public officials should not be permitted to derive personal economic gain from
the use of inside or confidential information to which their government position gives
them access. For example, an employee of the agency regulating the assignment of
airline routes should not be permitted to use inside information that a lucrative air
route is about to be assigned to a particular carrier for the purpose of speculating in
the stock of that carrier. On the other hand, the determination as to exactly what
'A law pertaining to bribery of judges was enacted in 179o, Rev. Stat. § 5449 (1875). Until October
23, 1962, most of the anti-bribery statutes were codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2O-223 (i958), the first general
prohibition having been enacted in 1853.
" 11c likelihood of this happening in federal procurement is becoming increasingly remote because
of the large number of persons who ordinarily participate in contract actions, the rigid compartmentaliza-
tion of their duties, and the many stages of review.
a o Stat. 170 (1853), as amended, i8 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
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information the government official should not be permitted to use for his personal
advantage is extraordinarily difficult and not readily amenable to statutory definition.
If unreasonable restraints are placed on the use of information, the cure can be worse
than the disease.
In addition to these primary areas of conflict of interest, there are several
peripheral aspects that are important enough to merit consideration. They include
outside employment; 5 influence peddling; special financial interests; contingent fees;
kickbacks; ex parte communications and organizational conflicts. Kickbacks and
contingent fees are barred by general statutes," but the other violations are dealt with
only in department and agency regulations or in laws of limited application.
BACKGROUND
Government has not always been the full time job it is now. During much
of the nineteenth century it was common for federal government officials to hold
jobs in addition to their official posts. This was true in all branches of the govern-
ment and was in large measure attributable to the fact that the pay of public officials
was very low and the demands of their positions not very great. Most congressmen
pursued active law practices and many judges and appointees in the executive branch
were engaged in agricultural or professional pursuits in addition to their government
duties.
Despite their disadvantages, government jobs were much sought after as rewards
for political activity in behalf of elected officials. To the political as well as the
military victor belonged the spoils; and the appointment of the political party faithful
to federal posts was an important factor in the maintenance of effective political
organizations. There was no merit system in the federal service and professional
standards were unknown.
Gross abuses resulting from what is now known as conflict of interest soon
became evident. During peacetime, they centered around claims against the govern-
ment which were often prosecuted by congressmen and other high federal officials.
In time of war, these abuses took the form of award of government contracts for
supplies and services to favorites or personal interests of government officials.
The ethics in government service during most of the i8oos were deplorably low. 7
Even during the darkest days, however, efforts were made to curb some of the
most flagrant abuses. One of the first general conflict of interest statutes enacted in
853 forbade government officials to assist in the prosecution of claims against the
'An outside or second job-referred to in labor circles as "moonlighting"-can often adversely
affect the performance of a public official simply by causing excessive demands on his time and energy.
There is also the possibility that such outside employment will be so closely related to the government
duties of the public official that self-dealing or inappropriate use of confidential information become
irresistible temptations.
6 6o Stat. 37 (1946), as amended, 74 Stat. 740 (ig6o), 41 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. x962) (kickbacks); io
U.S.C. § 23o6 (1958); 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958) (contingent fees).
'For a history of the federal service, see generally PAUL R. VAN RPa, HisToRY oF TE UNITRE STA'rs
CIVIL SERVICE (i958); Jr.As G. "RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCnON (1937).
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United States.8 The criminal sanctions of this and similar laws, coupled with im-
proved procedures in the Court of Claims, did much to eliminate claims abuses.
Another statute enacted in 18629 made it a crime for government officials to receive
consideration in connection with the award of contracts, thus striking at the major
wartime abuse.' °
It is noteworthy that when serious problems relating to conflict of interest became
evident, statutory efforts were made to correct them,"' but this had the result of
imposing a "Topsy" effect on such laws. The establishment of the merit system
in an organized federal civil service in 188312 provided the foundation for the
emergence of big government that was to begin in 1933. The patchwork of con-
flict of interest statutes that existed until October 1962, was totally inadequate for
resolving the ethical problems posed by all pervasive government of full time pro-
fessional experts where standards of conduct must be of the highest order if public
confidence is to be maintained. Nor were existing laws well adapted to the strict
ethical requirements being laid down by Congress in approving high-level federal
appointments and by the courts in recent conflicts cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a very rigid
ethical standard will be applied in situations involving conflict of interest within the
federal government. In the famous Dixon-Yates case, 3 the Court held invalid a con-
tract for construction of a steam generating plant between a power company and
the Atomic Energy Commission on the ground that an investment corporation
officer then acting as an unpaid consultant for the Bureau of the Budget could
have influenced decisions regarding the financing of the project to a sufficient extent
so that his employer might have derived a profit. The Court applied an old post-
Civil War penal disqualification statute'4 in ruling that the possibility of profit as a
i ro Stat. 170 (1853).
12 Stat. 577 (1862).
o For a full discussion of the other conflict of interest statutes enacted during this period, see BAR
AssocIATioN REPORT 36-49.
"
1The most glaring exception to this attitude is Congress itself which has displayed a conspicuous lack
of enthusiasm for enacting legislation that would truly eliminate conflict of interest problems with respect
to itself. Public intolerance of corruption in our federal government is to be contrasted with the
situation in some other nations where graft, bribery, and self-dealing among government officials must
be accepted as a fact of life.
1z22 Stat. 403 (883), known as the Pendleton Act. It is interesting to note that the establishment
of a genuine merit system for recruitment of federal employees largely deprived the party system of
its primary method of allocating rewards for effort in securing the election of political candidates. No real
substitute for this reward has been found. Many policy and confidential federal posts are still appointive
but such appointments are now made primarily on the basis of demonstrated ability rather than on the
theory of the spoils system. Only in the appointment of certain postmasters does the spoils system
survive in anything resembling its original context.
"'United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
24 18 U.S.C. § 434 (i958), which stated: "Whoever, being an officer, agent, or member of, or directly
or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, joint stock company,
or association, or of any firm or partnership, or other business entity, is employed or acts as an officer
or agent of the United States for the transaction of business, shall be fined not more than $2,ooo or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
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result of the conflict in interest was enough to violate the public policy aspect of the
law and render the contract invalid ab initio 5
The Senate has also made it clear that it does not necessarily agree that what is
good for General Motors is good for the country.' Cases in which high government
officials have resigned under circumstances involving conflict of interest continue to
crop up. Two of the most recent have involved Fred Korth, former Secretary of the
Navy, and Robert Baker, Majority Secretary of the United States Senate.' Nor have
congressmen themselves been immune from sanction. Former congressmen Frank
W. Boykin of Alabama and Thomas F. Johnson of Maryland were recently indicted
for violating section 281 of the Criminal Code by rendering special services to
persons outside the government.
THE NEW LEGISLATION
Recognizing that existing conflicts of interests statutes were inadequate for the
enforcement of the high ethical standards of conduct being demanded, Congress, un-
der the prodding of numerous interested groups, most notably the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, completely revised the law relating to many aspects
of conflict of interest, and this legislation became effective on January 21, 1963 as
Public Law 87-8493 s The new law added sections 2oi-2o9 and 218 to chapter eleven
of title eighteen of the United States Code, redesignated former sections 214, 215,
217-222 as 21o-2i7, eliminated old sections 201-213, which pertained to various aspects
of bribery, by combining them into new section 201, repealed sections 216, 223, 282,
284, 434 and I914,"9 and combined their substance into new sections 204, 207 and 208.
Old sections 281 and 283 were partially repealed in so far as they applied to public
officials and their substance combined into new sections 203, 204, 205, 207 and 209,
but were left standing as they apply to retired regular officers of the armed forces
of the United States.20
5 5 The Dixon-Yates case actually arose when the government cancelled a contract for construction
of the power plant because of no further need and the contractor sued for breach of contract damages.
One of the main defenses asserted by the government was invalidity of the contract because of conflict
of interest even though the statute contained no contract cancellation clause for its violation as did some
of the other then existing conflict of interest laws. The Court ignored this technicality and rested its
decision on the general public policy issue even though no criminal prosecution had been or ever was
initiated as specifically provided by the statute. The Court concluded by holding that, since the govern-
ment had received no benefit from the contract, there could be no quantum valebat recovery. The
contractor, therefore, sustained a loss of approximately $Si.8 million on the transaction.
16 Hearings Be/ore the Senate Armed Forces Committee on Armed Services, on Nominees Designate:
Charles E. Wilson, Roger M. Kyes and Others, 83d Cong., ist Sess. 6-ig (953). Mr. Wilson, to whom
the statement is attributed, was ultimately confirmed as Secretary of Defense but on condition that he
divest himself of his stock in General Motors, of which he had been president.
.7Korth was accused of using official Navy stationery for writing business letters to companies
interested in dealings with the government. He resigned without any comment as to these accusations.
Baker was accused of outside business dealings and influence peddling involving certain government
agencies. Senate hearings on Baker's multifarious activities have provided interesting television viewing in
recent weeks.
1s 76 Stat. iiig (1962), x8 U.S.C.A. §§ 2oI-219 (1963).
19 Pub. L. No. 87-849 also repealed section 99 of title 5, U.S. Code, an old post-employment statute that
placed a two-year ban on former government employees prosecuting claims which were pending in the
department in which they were formerly employed.
2' Table showing the effect on existing statutes of Pub. L. No. 87-849.
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Section 2oi includes all of the general bribery prohibitions of the new law and
applies to all public officials in any branch of the federal government including
members of Congress. It forbids the transfer of anything of value to a public official
or to anyone designated by a public official where the intent of such transfer is to
influence an official act, to cause any public official to participate directly or indirectly
in fraud or to induce any act or omission violative of the official's lawful duty.
The prohibition is directed equally at the person exerting the influence and the
public official who solicits or succumbs to the bribe 2 The section concludes with
an injunction against the giving of anything of value to a public official "for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed."22 The first part of the
Old Sections New Sections Added Sections
TITLE 18 T-LE x 8 Tm. x 8
201 combined into 201 201-209
202 " " 201
203 tt " 201
204 't 't 201
205 't " 201
206 t 20!
207 t 20
208 't " 20
209 tt t 201
210 ' l' 201
211 " " 201
212 " t' 201


















99 repealed 207 202, 206, 209, 218
"' Also prohibited is any similar act intended to influence the testimony of witnesses before courts,
Congress, agencies or officers legally authorized to take testimony. The penalties for such attempts
to influence official acts, officials, or testimony are severe-a fine not to exceed $20,000 or three times
the value of the bribe, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not over fifteen years, or both, and
possible, though not mandatory, disqualification from holding any responsible federal office in the future.
"
2 This part of the section also applies to testimony of witnesses and carries lesser penalties (fine not
exceeding Sio,ooo or imprisonment for not over two years, or both) than those applied to acts ipecifically
intended to exert influence.
'The special exemptions to these statutes were retained by the new law as applied to legislative and
judicial branches.
'Not repealed as applied to regular retired members of the armed forces of the United States.
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section, therefore, applies to acts intended to influence or corrupt, and the second
part outlaws the giving of any rewards for official acts performed or to be per-
formed.
The language of section 2oi is sweeping and is specifically designed to prohibit
all aspects of bribery, including rewards. The prohibition applies to any attempt
to influence, corrupt, or reward regardless of whether the official approached has it
within his power or authority to bring about the objective sought. The wording of
this part of the section makes it apparent that specific intent must be proved in
order to convict the offeror of the thing of value where the objective is to influence
an official act, cause the commission of fraud or induce an act or omission in violation
of a lawful duty.23 Proof of specific intent on the part of the offeror is the element
that makes control of bribery under the penal statutes difficult, and it is the existence
of intent that distinguishes this aspect of a bribe from a pure gift. The word
"intent" is not used with reference to the wrongful act of the recipient or designer of
the thing of value (the "bribee," so to speak), nor is it used at all with respect to
the giving or receiving of rewards for public acts. It would appear, then, that proof
of specific intent may not be required for conviction under these parts of section 2o
and there is case law to support this conclusion.24 Nevertheless, some evidence
linking the thing of value (cause) and the official act or omission (effect) appears
necessary in order to secure conviction. Although the language of section 2oi
appears sufficiently broad to reach every aspect of bribery, it does not forbid the
making of or receipt of pure gifts where there is no connection shown between the
thing of value and the official act. 5
"Numerous cases decided on the basis of similar wording in the superseded bribery action have so
held. United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Bowler, 183 F. Supp. 237
(D. Maine 1958).
24 Razete v. United States, x99 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 904 (1953). The
decision of the court in this case is of more than passing interest because of its interpretation of statutory
language very similar to that used in section 2or. Razete, president of a company that obtained a con-
tract with the Air Force under rather dubious circumstances, was convicted of giving a bribe in the form
of cash and a radio to a contracting officer of the Air Materiel Command. The contract awarded
Razete's Company was for supplies to be used in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The statute
authorizing this Program contained the following clause (since repealed): "Whoever offers or gives to
anyone who is now or in the past two years has been an employee or officer of the United States any
commission, payment or gift in connection with the procurement of equipment, materials or services
under this chapter, and whoever, being or having been an employee or officer of the United States in the
past two years, solicits, accepts or offers to accept any such commission, payment or gift, shall upon
conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not to exceed $So,ooo or imprisonment for not to exceed three
years, or both." 22 U.S.C. § 1584 (1952). In upholding the conviction of the federal district court,
the court of appeals pointedly noted that, since the wording of the statute departed from the common
law description of bribery, it thus created a new statutory crime for conviction of which proof of specific
intent was not required. Here it was the offeror who was found guilty of violating the statute, the offeree
(the contracting officer) having pleaded guilty. It seems clear that the wording in the latter part of section
2o is subject to the same interpretation.
"SChapter ix of title 18 also contains some specific prohibitions of bribery in addition to the general
prohibition of § 201. Sections 210 and 211 prohibit the giving or accepting of anything of value for the
purpose of obtaining any federal appointive office. Section 2x also forbids the payment or collection
of anything of value for securing employment with the federal government. Both sections impose criminal
sanctions. Sections 212 and 213 make it a crime to bribe a federal bank examiner; §§ 214 and 215 impose
criminal penalties for bribery in connection with a Federal Reserve bank loan or discount of commercial
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Section 202 defines a new category of federal employee, that of "special Govern-
ment employee," referred to in sections 203, 205, 207, 208, and 209 of the substantive
provisions. A special government employee is an officer or employee of the executive
or legislative branches or of any independent federal agency26 who is hired to perform
duties on a temporary or intermittent basis with or without compensation for not
more than 13o days during any period of 365 consecutive days5 The 3o day
test applies only prospectively to the duration of the appointment. If it turns out that
the employee serves more than 13o days out of 365, he does not thereby lose his
special status.
28
Special government employees usually consist of consultants, advisers, and other
intermittent employees whose duties are not intended to be continuous or of extended
duration. The substantive provisions of the new conflict of interest legislation appro-
priately recognize that individuals filling these unusual positions should receive
different treatment from that accorded regular federal employees. A representative
of a non-governmental activity who is requested to appear before a government
department or agency and is not paid a salary by the government is not an official
or employee of the government-either regular or special-and the prohibitions of
this statute do not apply to him.?
Section 203 imposes a broad prohibition on the solicitation or receipt of outside
compensation for services rendered by a government official or his designee before
any United States department, agency, or commission in behalf of private parties
with respect to any transaction in which the federal government has a direct or sub-
paper; § 216 prohibits the giving or receiving of commissions or gifts in connection with federal farm
loans, land bank or small business transactions; § 217 forbids acceptance of consideration for a compromise
of farm indebtedness under the feedral farm loan program. Sections 210-2,7 were not part of Pub. L.
87-849,
5 5 Included are employees or officers of the District of Columbia government.
Persons serving as part time representatives of members of Congress in the member's home district
or state are classified as special government employees regardless of the duration of their appointment, and
a Reserve Officer of the Armed Forces or an Officer of the National Guard either of whom is serving
involuntarily is classified as a special government employee regardless of the duration of such duty.
Enlisted personnel of the armed services are neither regular nor special government employees.
8 This interpretation is based on the President's Memorandum on Preventing Conflicts of Interest on
the Part of Special Government Employees, May 2, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 4539 (1963), and leaves open the
possibility of avoiding certain strictures of the new law by artificially making short term appointments. There
is little doubt that any substantial abuse of the "special employee" classification would be questioned by
the Comptroller General. If an individual is appointed on the same date to serve more than one
agency, the duration estimates are added together to determine whether or not he qualifies as a special
employee. Should the additional appointments not occur on the same date, then the employee's status
is determined by adding the number of days already worked since the first appointment to the estimate
of days to be worked for each agency at the time of the later appointment. If this total exceeds 13o days
out of the 365 day period beginning with the date of the first appointment, the employee loses his
"special" status. The duration of a special employee's appointment extends from the day the appointment
takes effect until the day it ends, regardless of the actual number of days worked during that period.
' Id. at 4545. Even though the "representative" may receive a travel allowance or "per diem"e in
lieu of travel expenses, he does not necessarily lose his exempt status thereby. Other factors that may
be relevant in determining whether a particular person is a "representative" rather than a special
Government employee are: membership on a committee organized specifically for the purpose of presenting
the viewpoints of non-governmental groups or organizations; the fact that he is appointed to an agency
by a non-governmental organization, and not in a position to act as a spokesman for the government.
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stantial interest. The prohibition covers officers and employees in all branches, de-
partments, and agencies of the federal government, including members of Congress,
and makes the person offering the special compensation subject to its penalties along
with the recipientY0  Although the section enumerates appearances before courts-
martial as a proscribed transaction, it pointedly does not mention other judicial
actions and must, therefore, be construed not to cover proceedings before a regular
court. It is not clear from its wording whether the prohibition of section 203
applies to any services rendered in connection with proceedings before any depart-
ment, agency, and so on, or whether it applies only to services rendered before any
department in connection with any proceedings. The first interpretation is obviously
the more inclusive, but the second appears to represent the currently prevailing
view31 The application of section 203 is restricted in three significant areas: (a) It
applies to a "special Government employee" only in a matter involving a specific party
in which he has participated personally and substantially or in a transaction pending
before a department or agency in which he has served more than sixty out of the
previous 365 consecutive days;32 (b) it does not preclude an officer or employee from
acting as agent or attorney on behalf of his immediate family or any estate or person
he represents as a fiduciary except with respect to those matters in which he has
participated personally and substantially as part of his official duties; 3 (c) the third
restriction in the application of section 203 applies only to special government
employees and seems well adapted to protect the eligibility of a prospective govern-
ment contractor or grantee whose employee is called in as a consultant on a procure-
ment matter of possible interest to his private employer. If the cognizant government
department or agency head specifically certifies in writing that the national interest
so requires and causes this certification to be published in the Federal Register, a
special Government employee can act as attorney or agent for another person in
the performance of work under a federal government grant or contract. There are
no other qualifications on this exemption and its application obviously extends to
matters in which the special employee may have participated directly and per-
sonally.34  Section 203 has a direct impact on procurement activities and it is clear
3The effect of the prohibition is government wide. It applies to a particular employee with
respect to transactions before any other government agency and forbids compensation for pre-employment
services and before or after the fact payment for services rendered during the period of government
employment. Section 2o and this subsection of § 203 also carry as a penalty for their violation permanent
disqualification from responsible federal office, in addition to fine and imprisonment.
"For further discussion of this point, see Perkins, The New, Federal Conflct-o/.lnterest Law, 76
H.Mv. L. REv. 1113, 1145 (1963).
"Ile latter restriction applies throughout his department or agency (but is not government-wide)
whether or not the special employee participated in the transaction or even was aware of it, Note that
the 6o-day rule is retrospective and includes only actual days worked, rather than prospective, as is the
13o-day rule. Time worked at another agency does not contribute toward the 6o-day period.
"in order to act in this capacity, the government employee must obtain the approval of the official
who appointed him.
"
4 It is not cear why the words "attorney or agent" were used when the exemption appears to
cover all of the activities to which § 203 applies.
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that any special services by a government official to a contractor or prospective con-
tractor for which compensation is received are within its prohibition.
Section 204 plugs one of the obvious loopholes left open by section 203. It simply
prohibits members of Congress and resident commissioners from practicing before
the Court of Claims. The prohibition includes elected congressmen or commissioners
even though they may not yet have taken office. In addition to fine and imprison-
ment for conviction of violating this section, lifetime disqualification from holding
government office may be imposed.
Section 205 is very similar to section 203 with respect to its application and ex-
ceptions and like section 203 covers acts of government officials as representatives of
outsiders. There are, however, some significant distinctions between the two pro-
visions. Section 205 covers representational activity as agent or attorney in the
prosecution of claims against the government or in appearances before any court, de-
partment, agency or commission in connection with any proceeding, contract, or other
transaction in which the government is a party or has a direct or substantial interest.
Also expressly barred is the receipt of any gratuity, share of or interest in any claim
as consideration for assistance in its prosecution. The prohibition applies to all
government officials and employees in acts representing private persons (outside
the government) as does section 203, but, unlike that section, does not apply to
members of Congress. Also of significance is the fact that section 205 covers court
actions, while section 203 does not. This anomaly preserves the loophole carved by
section 203 permitting congressmen to handle court cases35 in which the federal
government is a party or has a substantial interest. The most substantial difference
between sections 2o3 and 205 is that compensation must have been solicited or
received for the services rendered in order to bring such activity within the prohibi-
tion of section 203, whereas section 205 bars the described representational activities
whether compensation is solicited or received for them or not. Although these two
sections employ different language to describe the prohibited activities they cover,36
the Department of Justice interpretative memorandum3 discussing the new legisla-
tion regards the sections as applying to similar kinds of acts with the exception of
court actions. Section 205 also has exactly the same restrictions in its application to
"Except, of course, before the Court of Claims as prohibited by § 204.
"0 Section 203 refers to "official duties or services in relation to any proceeding, application, request
for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
particular matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct or substantial interest, before any
department, agency, court martial, officer, or any civil, military or naval commission." Section 205
specifies "acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department, agency, court, court martial,
officer, or any civil, military or naval commission in connection with any proceeding, application, request
for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
particular matter in which the United States is a party or has a substantial interest." While it seems
apparent that the "representational activity" covered by § 205 is not limited to personal appearances
and can include other modes of communication with federal officials such as the signing of bids or
contracts, the scope of this section as to prohibited activities does not seem quite as broad as that
of § 203 with its sweeping reference to "services."
"' Department of justice Memorandum Regarding Conflict of Interest Provisions of Public Law No.
87-849, Jan. 28, r963, 28 Fed. Reg. 985, 987 (1963).
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special government employees and family or fiduciary representation as has section
203. One additional exemption from the application of section 205 is added. No
officer or employee is prevented from acting without compensation as agent or
attorney for any person who is the subject of disciplinary, loyalty, or other personnel
proceedings unless to do so would directly conflict with that official's duties.38 A
phrase in section 2o7(c) makes section 205 applicable to partners of officials and
executives in the executive branch but imposes a lesser penalty on themY0
Section 206 is very brief and states that sections 203 and 205 do not apply to
retired officers of the uniformed services of the United States while not on active
duty, unless they otherwise qualify as government officers or employees. This
section also excepts from the application of sections 203 and 205 government officials
and employees and other persons specifically exempted by other statutes.40
Section 207 deals with postemployment disqualification of federal officials and
employees of the executive branch or independent agencies41 in matters connected
with their former duties or official responsibilities. Part (a) of the section forbids
any acts as agent or attorney by a former government official or employee before
a court, department, agency or commission in connection with particular matters
involving specific parties in which the government is a party or has a direct and sub-
stantial interest and in which the former employee or official participated personally
or substantially. This prohibition refers primarily to representational activity and
binds special government employees as well as regular ones. The ban imposed by
section 207(a) is permanent. Since the subsection applies to specific transactions, it
ordinarily would not include acts associated with rule-making or formulation of
general policy.
Part (b) of section 207 applies to the same class of employees and officials as
"
5 Does this exception apply to "special government employees" even though they are not specifically
designated? The Department of Justice interpretative memorandum states that the words "government
officer or employee" include "special government employees" even though some sections of the statute
use the wording "officer or employee, including special government employee." Id. at 987 n.5. It is
also probable that this exemption applies to § 203.
"There is every reason to believe that the application to partners of government officials and
employees in the executive branch operates on section 203 as well. The penalties applied to partners for
violation of the sections applicable to them are a fine not to exceed $,ooo or imprisonment for not
over one year or both.
" The provision concerning statutory exemptions appears to be primarily prospective in its outlook.
A number of statutes currently in effect carry specific exemptions from some or all of the laws relating
to conflicts. Included among them are: the Defense Production Act of ig5o, 64 Stat. 8rg (x95o), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 216o (1958); the Renegotiation Act of z95r, 65 Stat. 22 (x95x), as amended,
50 U.S.C. § 1223 (1958); the Mutual Security Act, 75 Stat. 451 (ig6x), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2386
(Supp. IV, 1962). Most of these exemptions apply only to consultants or advisers serving without
compensation.
Section 2 of Pub. L. No. 87-849, z8 U.S.C. § 281 (Supp. IV, 1962) expressly extended previous
statutory exemptions from the conflict of interest laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 281, 282, 283, 284, 434 (1914)) to
the new act as such exemptions applied to officials and employees in the legislative and judicial
branches. Section 2, however, repealed all prior statutory exemptions as they applied to officers and
employees in the executive branch or in independent agencies and the government of the District of
Columbia.
" Including employees of the District of Columbia.
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does part (a) and sets up a one year post-employment prohibition with respect to
those matters that were the "official responsibility" of the employee or official at any
time during the last year of his government employment42 The prohibition applies
only to personal appearances as agent or attorney but would probably cover a
person signing a brief submitted in connection with an action before a board of
contract appeals. The reach of section :07 (b) is specific enough so that if an
employer or official transferred from the Department of the Air Force to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), worked at NASA
for eight months and then resigned to accept employment with a private electronics
company, the post-employment ban with respect to his official responsibilities as an
employee of the Air Force would end four months after accepting the private
employment, provided that there was no overlap of those responsibilities in his
work with NASA. One caveat, however, is worthy of mention. Section 207(a)
and (b) applies to both regular and special government officers and employees
whereas sections 203 and 205 exempt special government employees from most of
their application. It could happen, therefore, that a special government employee
to whom the prohibitions of the statute did not apply during the period of his
government employment could come within the one year post-employment ban of
section 207 (b) with respect to matters that were within the scope of his official
responsibilities.43 Government employees (regular or special) having scientific or
technological qualifications can be exempted from the application of section 207 with
respect to particular matters in the scientific or technological field if the head of the
department or agency concerned certifies that such exemption is in the national
interest and publishes this certification in the Federal Register.
Since the activities proscribed by section 207(a) and (b) are primarily repre-
sentational in character, a former government official would not be precluded from
aiding or assisting his private employer in connection with work for which he had
official responsibility while with the government. He would, however, violate the
terms of the section by negotiating for his employer a change order of a contract
the statement of work for which he had prepared while he was a government
official.
Section 207(c) imposes some special restrictions on those who stand in a partner-
"The term "official responsibility" is defined in section 2o2 as "the direct administrative or
operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable alone or with others, and
either personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct government action."
It is clear that the term "official responsibility" is broader in applying to the official acts of the
government official than is the expression "matters in which he participated personally and substantially"
used in section 207(a). Official responsibility appears to refer to those matters which were before his
department or agency during the final year of his employment and which he could affect either directly
or indirectly. The concept probably embraces "staff" as well as "line" responsibilities. See Perkins,
supra note 31, at ii28.
"'As pointed out in the Department of justice Interpretive Memorandum, supra note 37, at 987
n.7, the official responsibilities of special government employee are not likely to be very extensive. Note
that the prohibitions of subsections 207(a) and (b) apply to a former employ= "'f the executive branch
even though he may not have left the government entirely but merely transfe.:id to a position in the
legislative or judicial branches, supra note 37, at 987 n.6.
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ship relation to general or special government officials and employees in the
executive branch or in independent agencies. Such partners are prohibited from
acting as attorneys or agents for anyone but the federal government in any judicial
or other proceeding (including contract matters) in which the government has a
direct interest and in which the government partner participated directly and sub-
stantially or had official responsibility. Here, again, the ban covers representational
activity and applies only during the actual period during which the government
partner is employed. The most important problem with respect to partners is
whether the nongovernment partner is subject to criminal penalty because of the
forbidden acts of his partner who is a government employee or official and who
violates one of the provisions of the new law, and vice-versa. It is probable that no
imputation of guilt to a partner occurs because, if it did, the exculpatory clause that
concludes subsection (c) would be meaningless 4 The prohibition with respect to
partners does not apply unless one of them is currently in the government service
and it is thus strange that it was placed in section 207. The substantive application
of the restraints on nongovernmental partners of government officials and employees
is solely with respect to the representational activities covered by sections 2o3 and
2o5 and does not apply to post-employment activity. The application of section
207 is specific and receipt of compensation is not a condition for its violation. It has
particular import to the government procurement official who decides to resign
from the federal service and try his fortunes in industry.
Section 2o8 is directed at personal financial interests of government officials and
employees and applies only to those in the executive branch or in independent
agencies.45 It prohibits any such person from representing the government in a
judicial or other governmental proceeding with respect to a matter in which he has
a financial interest. Section 2o8 applies to acts of officials as representatives of the
government in contrast to sections 2o3 and 205 which apply to acts of officials as
representatives of persons outside the government. The section is all inclusive as to
types of transactions covered and its prohibition extends to financial interests in all
kinds of private organizations46 in which the government official may be a partner,
"See Perkins, supra note 31, at i16o-6i. The exculpatory clause of subsection 207(c) provides
that the nongovernmental partner shall be subject to the provisions of sections 203, 205, and 207
only as expressly provided in section 207(c). This wording negatives the imputation doctrine with
respect to the nongovernment partner, and its reciprocal operation in favor of the government partner
appears also to be a logical conclusion.
" Also specifically covered by this section are special government employees and employees of the
District of Columbia.
" Section 2o8 covers participation through "decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the
rendering of advice, investigation or otherivise in a judicial or other proceeding, application, request for
a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
particular matter, in which, to his knowledge he, his spouse, minor child, partner, organization in which
he is serving as officer, trustee, director, partner or employee .... " The prohibition applies to "particular
matters" as distinguished from policy formulation or general rule making. The organizations covered
would include non-profit as well as commercial ones. As Perkins points out, the non-partnership
interests of the government employee's partner or the non-organizational personal interests of his other
business associates would presumably not come within the prohibition of § 208. Perkins, supra note 31,
at 1132.
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officer, director, trustee, or employee or to any person or organization with which
he may be negotiating or have an arrangement for future employment. Any
financial interest in the particular transaction on the part of the spouse, minor
child, partner, or organization with which he is affiliated that is known to the
government official violates the prohibition of section 208.
There are two important exemptions from the application of section 208. It does
not apply to a government official or employee who makes full disclosure of his
financial interest to the government official who appointed him and receives a
written determination from that official that improper conflict of interest is not
involved. Nor does it apply to classes of employees that have been exempted by
general regulation published in the Federal Register on the basis that their financial
interest is not substantial enough to impair their integrity. This provision provides
an admirable mechanism for clarification of troublesome financial interest questions
through the issuance of general regulations.
Section 209 places a limitation on outside compensation of government officials.
It too applies only to regular employees and officers of the executive branch and
independent agencies47 and prohibits them from receiving any salary or other
compensation for performance of their official duties except from a governmental
source, be it federal, state or local 4 The penalties of section 209 apply equally to
the payor and the payee of such emoluments. There are, however, some important
exceptions to the application of this section. It does not prevent any of the employees
to whom it applies from accepting income from a pension, retirement, insurance or
other benefit plan provided by a former employer. This provision is a frank recog-
nition of the significance of vested security plans and should make it much easier
for government agencies to recruit qualified personnel. It permits the government
official to be rewarded for past services to a private employer without compromising
his integrity and usefulness as a public servant 9 Nor does section 209 bar outside
compensation to any government official or employee, be he regular or special, who is
serving without compensation."
The final substantive section of Public Law 87-849 is section 218, a catch-all
section designed to bestow on the government a special remedy where there has
been any violation of the earlier sections of the chapter. 1  Whereas the first
" Employees and officers of the District of Columbia government also come within the scope of this
section.
S Section 2o9 appears to proscribe anything that can be called compensation. It seems clear that
the employer of a business executive would be precluded from making up the difference between the gov-
ernment salary of the executive while in the federal service and his former salary in private industry. The
Comptroller General has also ruled that a government official cannot accept expenses of official travel from
outside sources, 36 DEcs. Coup. GEN. 155 (1956). This section does not, however, place any restriction
on income received from legitimate outside employment.
' Section 209 imposes no requirement that pension and retirement plans qualify under the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it set up any other criteria for eligibility.
" Section 209 does not apply to payment or acceptance of payments under the Government Employees
Training Act, 72 Stat. 237 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 2301-2319 (Supp. IV, 1962).
51 IS U.S.C. §§ 201-217 (Supp. 1962).
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seventeen sections pertain to acts by individuals in their official capacity, section 218
refers uniquely to their acts. It specifies that any acto2 performed in connection with
a violation of any of the sections in chapter eleven for which there has been a con-
viction may be treated as void and without effect by the department or agency head
concerned. Furthermore, it permits the government to recover any money expended
or thing transferred or the value thereof. Since these remedies are specified to be in
addition to any others provided by law, the rule laid down in United States v.
Mississippi Valley Generating Co." is left standing and it appears that the govern-
ment may be able to cancel a contract made in violation of Public Law 87-849 even
though there has been no actual conviction.
There is no doubt that the new legislation represents a vast step forward in the
control of conflict of interest in the federal government. It places a whole new
arsenal of legal weapons at the disposal of enforcement authorities who must deal
with this problem. Even so, some critical comment on the new law is appropriate.
The new legislation is all penal in nature and thus wields a big stick where, in some
types of cases, a small one would do the job better. It is a well-known fact that the
penal statutes that made up the old law relating to conflicts were very seldom in-
voked. Although the new statute will undoubtedly have a strong deterrent effect, it
may be too severe for use in many situations. There is not a single section in the
new law that simply provides for removal of the offending government employee,
often the best solution for many problems. Nor are there any useful statutory
guidelines in many related areas such as improper use or disclosure of confidential
government information, 4 outside employment and ex parte communications.
The new act is unduly complex and will be difficult to interpret and administer.
Much of this needless complexity resulted from the efforts to exempt members of
Congress from certain provisions of the law. The new legislation also falls some-
what short of a goal that could have been achieved through a blanket prohibition
of gifts to government officials and employees. The test of an unlawful gratuity
should be: did it come from someone with whom the government person has dealt,
is now dealing or might deal in his official capacity? If so, it should be illegal per se.
The present test of whether a gratuity has influenced the government offcial places an
unnecessary and cumbersome burden of proof on him who would assert wrongdoing.
With respect to conflict of interest problems involving retired regular officers of
the armed and other uniformed services, the new legislation merely compounded
already existing confusion. This problem will be discussed in detail later in this
article.
" Specifically mentioned are contracts, loans, grants, subsidies, licenses, rights, permits, franchises, uses,
authority, privileges, benefits, certificates, rulings, decisions, or rate schedules awarded, granted, paid,
furnished or published, or the performance of any services or transfers or deliveries of anything to, by
or for any agency of the United States or officer or employee of the United States or person acting in
behalf thereof.
= 364 U.S. 520 (g6i).
5 Here the term "confidential government information" is not intended to refer to information
affecting national security, the use and disclosure of which is controlled by other statutes and regulations.
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OnHR LEGISLATION AFFECTING CONFLICTS
Although Public Law 87-849 represents the bulk of general legislation per-
taining to conflict of interest, there are several other older statutes that have a direct
or indirect bearing on conflicts and apply particularly to procurement activities and
in some instances to specific agencies or persons.
A section in the Armed Services Procurement Act of I947"5 and its counterpart
in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949", are directed at
the payment of contingent fees, an arrangement that is the lifeblood of influence
peddling. Every recipient of a negotiated government contract is required to execute
a warranty that no contingent fee has been paid to obtain the contract except to a
bona fide employee or a regular selling agency.17 These statutes are not penal but
do permit the government to annul the contract without liability and recover any
contingent fee that was paid if the warranty is breached.58 Since the criteria with
respect to legitimate payment of contingent fees have become well defined, there
has not been serious difficulty with the use of this warranty clause in recent years.
The important thing is that the would-be contractor avoid any contingent fee
arrangement with a representative or selling agent that has the appearance of a
specific attempt to obtain a particular contract.
The Subcontractor Kickback Act" is unique in that it does not apply to govern-
ment officials at all, but it is significant in the procurement areas because it prohibits
certain conflict of interest abuses between government contractors and subcontractors
that could be detrimental to the government. Specifically, the act bans the payment
of any consideration by or on behalf of a subcontractor in connection with the
furnishing of goods or services to a prime contractor or any representative thereof
who holds a negotiated contract with the federal government 0 The government
is empowered to recover any monies paid out by prime contractors in violation of the
act and persons participating directly or indirectly in the paying or receiving of
1o U.S.C. § 2306 (1958).
" 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958).
G Both the Armed Service Procurement Regulation (ASPR) (§ 1-505), 32 C.F.R. § L505 (I961) and
the Federal Procurement Regulation (§ 1--505), 41 C.F.R. § I.5-505 (1963) contain detailed criteria for
determining whether the exceptions to the covenant against contingent fees apply in a given case. A
special form of warranty is used so that if the contractor states that a contingent fee was paid to other
than a full time employee, he is obliged to make a full disclosure of the circumstances in order
that the procuring agency can ascertain whether the statutory policy with respect to such payments has
been violated. The warranty on contingent fees must usually be submitted with the bid or proposal
that precedes a contractual undertaking.
8 The wording "without liability" seems to mean that the government would be obligated to pay for
any benefits received prior to cancellation of the contract, less the amount of the contingent fee paid.
The contractor may also be subjected to administrative blacklist for violating the warranty.
10 6o Stat. 37 (946), as amended, 74 Stat. 740 (i96o), 41 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV, 1962).
The prohibition also extends to payments between lower tier subcontractors on the theory that
the cost of such payments will ultimately be reflected in the cost or price paid by the prime for sub-
contractual work. The contracting officer is empowered to withhold payments to the prime contractor
if subcontractor kickbacks are reported to him and the General Accounting Office has authority to
investigate any suspected violations of this statute.
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such sums are subject to criminal penalties.01 The effect of this anti-kickback statute
is to impose essentially the same standard of conduct on government subcontractors
that the anti-bribery statutes impose on prime contractors and others in their dealings
with government officials. The prohibitions and penalties of the act do not apply
unless there is a "chain of contractual relationships" down to the violator.
Since 1951, there has existed a statutory requirement that all contracts involving
the expenditure of funds appropriated for the use of the Department of Defense
contain a clause prohibiting gratuities.0 The gratuities clause gives the government
the right to terminate a contract containing it if it is found that gratuities (gifts,
entertainment and so forth) were offered by the contractor or his representative
to any officer or employee of the government "with a view toward"0 3 securing a con-
tract or favorable treatment in the administration of such contract. If a violation
is found, the clause also gives the government the right to pursue its other remedies
for breach of contract and to assess against the contractor damages of not less than
three nor more than ten times the cost of the gratuity. The secretary of the military
department cognizant of the contract is required to have a hearing conducted in
order to determine whether a contractor charged under the clause is guilty, for which
notice is given and evidence taken by testimony and deposition. 4 The final decision
in the matter is rendered by the Secretary of the department and the contractor has
the right of appeal to the courts0 5 The Gratuities Act covers many of the things
prohibited by sections 2oI, 2o3, and 2o5 of the new conflicts legislation, but its
sanctions are directed solely against the contractor and the contract concerned. It is
not a penal statute and does not apply to individuals either in or outside of the
government. The prohibitions are directed .uniquely at procurement operations
and apply only to contracts financed by Department of Defense appropriations.
LAws GovERrINO CONGRESSIONAL CONFLICTS
The remaining special conflict of interest laws apply solely to members of Con-
gress, delegates to Congress and resident commissioners. 0 One statute0 7 subjects to
"
1Fines not to exceed Sio,ooo and imprisonment not to exceed two years or both. The penalties
of the act apply to both the offeror and the recipient.
"
2After appearing in several Defense appropriation acts, permanent legislation codifying this require-
ment was enacted in 1954, 68 Stat. 353 (954), 5 U.S.C. § 174d (1958).
"
5 The use of these words quoted from the statute is interesting. This phrase avoids the use of the
word intent and thus proof of specific intent would not seem to be required. The government would,
however, have to prove some connection between the gratuity and the receipt of a contract or favorable
treatment thereunder. As in the case of §§ 2o, 203 and 205 of Pub. L. No. 87-849 some cause and effect
relation must be shown. The Gratuities Act could, and should, but does not, outlaw a pure gift.
"Appendix D of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 21 (x963), sets out the
procedures to be observed in the conduct of this hearing.
" It should be noted that the giving of gratuities can subject the donor or offeror to other penal
sanctions such as prosecution for bribery under § 2oi of Pub. L. 87-849, fraud against the government, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1958) or conspiracy to defraud, I8 U.S.C. § 1001 (958). The Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation § 1-604.1, 32 C.F.R. § 1.604-1 (196i) provides that an administrative debarment for
up to three years may be imposed on a contractor violating the gratuities clause thus creating an in-
eligibility for the award of Defense Department contracts for such period.
" There are currently no delegates to Congress and only one resident commissioner, who is in
Puerto Rico.
67 18 U.S.C. § 431-432 (1958). A civil provision, 5o Stat. 838 (1937), 41 U.S.C. § 22 (1958),
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a fine of $3,ooo any congressman or commissioner who enters into or receives benefit
from any contract with a federal department or agency. The penalty also applies to
the government official awarding the contract. Furthermore, any contract made in
violation of this ban is void and the consideration paid by the government under
such a contract is subject to recovery in a suit at law. There are, however, a number
of exceptions to this law, usually referred to as "Officials Not to Benefit," which
considerably weaken its impact. Although the prohibition applies to a firm of which
the congressman is a partner, it does not cover a contract made by the corporation
for its benefit68 even though a congressman may own as much as a thirty per cent
interest and function as its president 9 Nor does it prevent a congressman from
acting as surety on a bond for a government contractor.7
Despite the numerous prohibitive statutes that apply to them, members of Con-
gress present some acute problems with respect to conflict of interest. Existing laws
do not begin to get at the heart of the matter. Only two parts of the general
conflicts statute (Public Law 87-849) apply to congressmen. They are section
2oi covering bribery and section 203 proscribing special assistance to individuals
outside of the government. But neither of these sections is violated unless an
attempted or actual exchange of something of value is involved and some connection
between this consideration and the improper act can be proved. The older sections
431 and 432 merely forbid members of Congress from entering into contracts with
the government and there are many situations in which this prohibition does not apply.
Possibly one of the best deterrents that relate to congressmen is a statute making
it unlawful for individuals and firms to make any political contributions during
the period of negotiation or performance of a contract financed by appropriated
funds71 This prohibition has serious limitations since it applies only to the period
of actual contract activity or negotiation and its sanctions apply only to the offerer
or solicitor of the contribution.
Although many obvious abuses are outlawed by existing laws, the real difficulty
arises when congressmen attempt to influence official government action for the
benefit of their constituents or for personal business and financial reasons. Any
conflict of interest statute designed to eliminate this abuse must steer a difficult
course between controlling, at one extreme, the great power of the legislators
because of their control over appropriations on which everything the government
requires that the "Officials Not to Benefit" condition be expressed in all government contracts covered by
the penal statute.
as 18 U.S.C. § 433 (1958). The remaining exemptions apply to transactions with specific govern-
ment agencies or under particular statutes such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Home
Owners' Loan Act. Exemptions to the application of the prohibition must be made a matter of public
record.
0 39 Ops. Art. G N. 165 (1938).
70 18 id. 286 (x885).
71 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1958). The prohibition covers the solicitation as well as the making or promise
of political contributions by direct or indirect means. The statute is penal and carries a fine of not
over $5,ooo and imprisonment not to exceed five years or both for its violation. The law covers only
prime contractors with the government and applies either to business entities or to the individuals
representing them.
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does depends, and, at the other end of the spectrum, preserving the time-honored
"representative role" through which congressmen act as champions for constituents
in their struggles with government bureaucracy.
It is one thing when a senator who has no committee or other legislative respohsi-
bility with respect to a particular government agency writes a follow-up letter on
behalf of a constituent inquiring about the status of some administrative action
pending before that agency. It is quite another when the chairman of a powerful
Senate Committee writes a letter to the agency for which he has legislative responsi-
bility advocating a specific course of action favoring a corporation of which he may
be a substantial stockholder in connection with a case pending before the agency.
Federal procurement is an area particularly sensitive to congressional influence
even where conflict of purely economic interest may be a relatively minor factor.
When the award of a large procurement contract is involved, political pressures some-
times become very great even though the member of Congress may not have a direct
financial interest. The recent TFX controversy is a case in point. It is very difficult
for the cognizant agency to carry out established procurement policy-laid down by
Congress itself in most instances-in the face of interference and pressure from mem-
bers of Congress. In the case of major procurement actions, as with other important
government moves, perhaps the ultimate question to be answered is: Where should
the final decision be made, in the executive or in the legislative branch of the govern-
ment? One strong argument against congressional intervention is that improved
administrative procedures and safeguards now established in government depart-
ments and agencies have substantially decreased the likelihood of injustice in the
decision-making process."2 This is particularly true of procurement actions.
Congressmen appear very willing to apply a strict code of ethics to everyone but
themselves. This double standard currently being employed by Congress with respect
to conflicts of interest is receiving ever greater public attention. 3 It is suggested
that the worst of the problem could be eliminated by a statute making the following
three provisions:
a. Close the loophole in Public Law 87-849 that now permits congressmen to handle
court cases in which the government is a party or has a substantial interest.
b. Prohibit congressmen from representing or assisting in proceedings of any kind
involving the government (whether in executive, judicial, or legislative branches) any
private individuals or business entities in whch such congressman has a substantial
economic interest. This prohibition to apply whether or not compensation is
received."4
"The widespread use of quasi-judicial tribunals and high-level boards that review the decisions
of agency officials is one obvious example of improved administrative procedure. The system is not perfect
yet, but great progress has been made.
" See Bogdikian & Oberdorfer, Conflict of Interest, Can Congress Crack Down on Its Own Members?,
Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 17, 1962, p. 2x.
", Logically, this disability should also apply to voting in Congress. It is not considered desirable
to include such a prohibition in a public statute. The matter could easily be handled as part of the
individual rules of the Senate and House of Representatives. Disclosure of the financial and business
interests of members would make it fairly easy to establish criteria for voting disqualification.
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c. Require all congressmen to make their financial and business interests a matter of
public record with criminal penalties for falsification.
Such a measure would make enforcement of existing laws pertaining to con-
gressional conflicts much easier and eliminate most of the currently flagrant abuses.
Equally important, the provision would not limit or impair the "representative"
function of congressmen with respect to their constituents except in cases where the
legislator has a substantial personal economic interest. Such a restriction scarcely
needs any justification. Congressmen might find the imposition of these measures
more palatable if they were given more adequate coverage of expenses arising from
the necessity of maintaining large office staffs and dual residences.
The practical fact still remains that if a meaningful law binding congressmen to
the same conflict of interest standard that has been imposed on the rest of the
government is to come into being, Congress itself will have to enact it. In the face
of existing attitudes, the probability that such legislation will soon be passed is slim.
Some positive action in this area will have to be taken shortly if public confidence
in the integrity of Congress is to be maintained.
REGuLATIONS
Any discussion of government department and agency regulations relating to
conflict of interest can well take as its point of departure the Code of Ethics for all
government employees passed as concurrent resolution 175 by the Eighty-fifth Con-
gress. This Code contains ten provisions, three of which pertain directly to
conflict of interest.75 It cites as improper conduct any discrimination in the per-
formance of public duties, receipt of compensation which might appear to have
influenced official acts, participation in business with the government in a manner
inconsistent with the conscientious performance of official duties, and use of
confidential or inside government information as a means of making personal profit.
" Code of Ethics for Government Service. Any person in government service should:
x. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or
government department.
2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States and of all governments
therein and never be a party to their evasion.
3. Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his duties his earnest
effort and best thought.
4. Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.
5. Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether
for remuneration or not; and never accept for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circum-
stances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his
governmental duties.
6. Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a government employee
has no private word which can be binding on public duty.
7. Engage in no business with the government either directly or indirectly, which is inconsistent with
the conscientious performance of his governmental duties.
8. Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance of governmental duties
as a means for making private profit.
9. Expose corruption wherever discovered.
xo. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust.
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The coming into effect of Public Law 87-849"O with its extensive changes
in the law relating to conflict of interest resulted in the issuance of many new regula-
tions by the various government departments and agencies. It is not a uniform
characteristic of these regulations to incorporate specific penalties for their violation.
They are, however, binding on the conduct of the officers and employees to whom
they apply, and in numerous places reference is made to the fact that breach of the
regulations may be the basis for discharge or disciplinary action. Some of the
regulations apply only to personnel within the agency, others affect outsiders who
deal with the agency.
Many of the new regulations have in common an interpretation and commentary
on the new conflicts statute. From there, they deal with various matters that are
the special interest of the particular agency. Most of the regulations do, however,
touch on such things as gratuities, gifts to superiors, bribery and graft, outside work
and financial interests.
The President's Memorandum on Preventing Conflicts of Interest on the Part
of Special Government Employees77 contains a special section on ethical standards
of conduct, and part of that section is devoted primarily to a discussion of the proper
use of inside information, a matter not dealt with in the new conflict of interest
statute. The memorandum specifically enjoins special government employees from
using inside or confidential information to which they have access because of
their official duties for personal profit. Neither the special employee nor members
of his family or business associates are permitted to -use such information for specula-
tive gain. 8 A previous executive order 9 applying only to presidential appointees
lays down prohibitions against non-compatible outside employment, gratuities, use
of public office for private gain, giving preferential treatment to anyone, and outside
compensation of any kind connected with official dutiesY0
Because of its dominant role in procurement, the Department of Defense regula-
tions regarding conflict of interest are highly developed and of particular interest.
Defense Directive 5500.7s8 sets out the standards of conduct required of personnel
in all of the subdivisions and agencies of the Department of Defense." The
Directive warns personnel against using their official positions to induce, or give
the appearance of inducing, another person to impart any economic benefit to them,
their families or business associates. Specifically mentioned in this connection
is the use of inside information.
70 I8 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-218 (Supp. 1963).
7728 Fed. Reg. 4539, 4544 (1963).
" This prohibition extends also to regular officers and employees of the government. This memo-
randum covers only special employees as defined in Pub. L. No. 87-849.
"
9Exec. Order No. 10939, 26 Fed. Reg. 3951 (1961).
" Excepted from the prohibition is outside reimbursement for reasonable travel and living expenses
for which no government payment is made. This would permit the official to receive reimbursement
connected with personal appearances at technical, cultural or political meetings and the like.
8128 Fed. Reg. 5666 (1963).
82 Including all officials, civilians, officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps.
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After a brief recital of the criminal penalties attaching to conviction for bribery
and graft, the Directive makes specific reference to the problem of gratuities. It
forbids the receipt by Department personnel or their families of any favor, gratuity or
entertainment that might affect, or might reasonably be interpreted as affecting,
complete objectivity and fairness in the performance of their official duties. Gratui-
ties from persons or organizations engaged in or seeking business dealings with the
Department are specified as within the proscribed category. It is clear that the
definition of a gratuity in this regulation is broader than that in Public Law 87-849
or in the special statute 3 discussed earlier. The definition here comes close to a ban
on pure gifts and conceivably could be strictly interpreted as exactly that. Its
application in practice has been somewhat more moderate. Although substantial
gifts, extravagant entertainment such as "girlie parties," expense paid vacations and
the like clearly violate this regulatory concept of a gratuity, the time honored "con-
tractor furnished lunch" and other amenities reasonably related to the conduct of
business probably do not.
Defense Directive 55oo.7 places a flat prohibition on the making of gifts or con-
tributions to superiors by Department employees. The penalty for violation is sum-
mary discharge and it applies to the solicitor or recipient as well as the donor8 4
Civilian personnel and officers on active duty are precluded from using their official
titles in connection with any commercial enterprises or promotions. 85 Outside
employment is permitted but only to the extent that it does not interfere with official
duties. Such activity must not reflect unfavorably on the government or place the
individual concerned in a position of conflict8 "
The Directive concludes with a summary of the new conflict of interest statute
and the requirement that Department personnel be informed of existing standards
of conduct at least twice a year.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS
One aspect of conflict of interest has not yet even been hinted at in the statutes,
but the complexities of government contracting procedures especially in the fields of
research and development have raised the possibility that there can be objectionable
conflicts involving organizations as well as personnel. This problem was recog-
nized officially in the Report to the President on Government Contracting for
Research and Development, usually referred to as the Bell Report,8 7 and centers
83 18 U.S.C. § x74d (x958). See p. 212, supra.
"'This prohibition also applies to the receipt of a gift from any employee being paid a salary
less than the recipient and reflects the requirement of an old statute. Rev. Stat. § 113 (1875), 5 U.S.C.
§ 113 (3958).
"'The Directive makes it clear that this rule does not limit the use of official titles on legitimate books
and scholarly works.
"6 This clause also bans the use of enlisted members of the armed services for civil duties that are
customarily performed by an available civilian work force. It further states that an active duty
officer of the regular Navy or Marine Corps may not be employed by any person supplying naval
supplies or war materials to the government and continue to receive his service pay.
"
7U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and
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around the role of the contractor having system engineering or technical direction
responsibility for work being performed under one or a series of contracts and his
eligibility for future production work arising out of such contracts. The Department
of Defense has addressed itself to this problem in a recent Regulation relating to
organizational conflicts of interest. 8s The stated objective of the Regulation is to
prevent the existence of conflicting roles that might bias a contractor's judgment and
to avoid placing any particular contractor in a position of unfair advantage over
competitors. Four basic rules are laid down which are rather technical in nature:
i. If a contractor agrees to provide systems engineering and technical direction
(SE/TD) for a system"9 without at the same time assuming contractual responsi-
bility for either (a) its development, (b) its integration, assembly and checkout
(IAC), or (c) its production, that contractor shall not later be allowed to supply
the system or any of its major components or to be a subcontractor or consultant
to any other supplier of the system or its major components. The purpose of this
rule is to avoid creating a situation in which the SE/TD contractor would be
tempted to make engineering decisions favoring his own products and thus gain a
competitive advantage during the production era.
2. If a contractor agrees to prepare and furnish complete specifications covering non-
developmental items for use in competitive procurement, that contractor shall not
be allowed to supply such items either as a prime or subcontractor during at
least the initial procurement period and possibly longer, depending on the circum-
stances. This rule does not apply if the specification or data preparation is
actually controlled by government representatives or in contracts for develop-
mental items. The purpose of this rule is essentially the same as that of rule one.
3. If a single contractor who has not participated in the design or development of a
system agrees to prepare the statement of work or related material to be used for
competitive procurement, such contractor may not supply any of the services, the
system or its major components unless he is the sole source. This situation
generates the same problems as specifications covered in rule two.
4. If a contractor agrees to conduct studies or provide advice concerning a system
Development, SEN. Doe. No. 94, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). This report was prepared by a committee
of high government officials, including Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; James E. Webb, Ad-
ministrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; John NV. Macy, Jr., Chairman, Civil Service
Commission; Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Alan T. Waterman, Director, Na-
tional Science Foundation; Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Tech-
nology; and with David E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget as Chairman. This aspect of conflict had
also been raised in several reports by congressional committees. See House Committee on Government
Operations, Organization and Management of Missile Programs, Eleventh Report, H.R. REP. No. 112i, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); House Committee on Government Operations, Air Force Ballistic Missile Manage-
ment, Formation of Aerospace Corporation, Third Report, H.R. RFAI. No. 324, 87 th Cong., 1st Ses.q.
(i96i).
"
8 Rules for the Avoidance of Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 28 Fed. Reg. 6449 (963), also
cited as Defense Directive 5500.10, June 1, 1963; ASPR x-io6.a, 32 C.F.R. § i.io6-i (Supp. 1963).
8 A "system" can consist of a weapon system, communications system, or any other integrated
device designed to perform a specific task. The Regulation defines "systems" to include subsystems,
projects, or items.
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and the work requires access to the proprietary data of other companies, the con-
tractor must agree to protect such data from unauthorized use and is not permitted
to use the data as a supplier of the system or its components in procurements arising
out of the study contract. This rule makes an important start in resolving problems
arising out of the use of proprietary data on d~fense contracts.
Left untouched by the new regulation was another area of possible conflict
mentioned in the Bell Report that can involve non-profit organizations. The
boards of directors (or trustees) of such organizations are often comprised of indi-
viduals having substantial commercial business interests. There is the possibility
that the objectivity of such a non-profit organization with respect to some govern-
ment contracts might be impaired by this fact.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has issued a regulation9" pertaining
to the new conflict of interest statute that ties its implementation directly into
the existing AEC organizational structure but otherwise closely resembles the
Department of Defense Directive. Tight restrictions are placed on the appearances
of former employees as attorneys or agents before AEC offices. Under such
circumstances, the former employee is required to file in advance with the Com-
mission a statement giving full particulars about the business he proposes to
transact. If information on the form discloses any violation of post-employment
restrictions imposed by Public Law 87-849, the General Counsel of AEC is authorized
to take appropriate action.
Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
Although not a procurement agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has isssued a recent regulation 9 that pertains to one of the important
peripheral areas of conflict of interest, ex parte communications. The regulation
incorporates into the SEC Code of Behavior certain recommendations made by the
Administrative Conference of the United States relating to ex parte communica-
tions. 2 It governs only such communications between outside persons and decisional
personnel within SEC relating to certain "on the record '93 cases pending before the
Commission. The regulation prohibits ex parte communications to designated
Commission officers and employees from outside persons and bars the solicitation
of such communications by SEC personnel. If an ex parte communication is
00 28 Fed. Reg. 3439 (I963).
ld. at 4446.
o For the text of this recommendation, see Recommendation No. 16, Administrative Conference of the
United States, Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States Submitted by the
Chairman of the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure to the Senate Comm. on the
Judiary, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., ist Ses. (1963).
"' Included in this category are proceedings in which an evidentiary hearing has been ordered such as
revocation of the registration of an investment broker or adviser, review of an order of a registered
national securities association expelling a member and action brought by SEC expelling or suspending a
member from a registered national securities association, action under the Holding Company and
Investment Company Acts in which no actual hearing has been ordered, and action to issue a stop order
or suspend an exemption under the Securities Act.
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transmitted, the regulation requires that it be brought to the attention of all other
parties to the proceeding to which it relates. Sanctions for breach of the rule are
provided in the form of discipline or discharge in the case of SEC employees and
suspension from practice before the Commission in the case of outsiders. In addi-
tion, violation may justify denial of the specific relief or benefit being sought in the
particular proceeding.
This regulation is significant because it is probably the first recognition by a
federal agency of the evils of ex parte communications. Such communications per-
form a role in conflicts of interest somewhat similar to that of money-they make it
easier for outsiders to influence public officials to use their offices in an unfair manner.
There is little doubt that the bar on ex parte communications will become more
widespread as government agencies recast their policies in accommodating to the
new ethical climate stimulated by Public Law 87-849.
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
For a number of years, certain federal agencies having responsibility in specific
areas have required their officers and employees to divest themselves of all financial
interests in those areas, or, sometimes in the alternative, to make full disclosure of
such interestsY4 The detailed requirements of section 208 of Public Law 87-849
make it necessary for government departments and agencies to define with consider-
able particularity just which types of financial interests are permitted and which
are not. Several regulations have already been issued on this subject,"' and others
are sure to follow."
It is to be expected that there will be a considerable development and refinement
of requirements and concepts relating to conflicts of interest on the part of govern-
ment officials as implementing and interpretative regulations are issued on this sub-
ject by the various departments and agencies. One trend already noticeable is the
tendency on the part of some agencies to apply the requirements of sections 203, 205,
and 207 of Public Law 87-849 to rule-making procedures in addition to the explicit
transactions covered by those sectionsY 7
RETIRED REGULAR OFFICERS
The forgotten man in existing conflict of interest statutes is the retired regular
officer of the armed forces and certain other uniformed servicesY8 The new laws
"'Typical examples would include the independent regulatory agencies such as Interstate Commerce
Commission, Federal Aviation Agency, and Civil Aeronautics Board.
9 See, for example, 28 Fed. Reg. 9288 (1963) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 27 id. 12612 (x962); 27
id. 5653 (z962); 28 id. 3021 (1963) (Small Business Administration); 27 id. 3812 (x962) (Dep't of the
Interior).
9 From present indications, it seems quite certain that government employees will be able to retain
any investments they have in mutual funds except in the rare case where there might be the possibility
of control over the management of the mutual fund's portfolio.
7 28 Fed. Reg. 2707 (1963) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 28 Fed. Reg. 13504 (1963) (Dep't of the
Interior).
"sThese include the Public Health Service, Coast Guard, and Coast and Geodetic Survey.
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and regulations in this area do nothing but make life more complicated and risky
for him.
It will be useful here to recapitulate the statutory application of Public Law
87-849 to the various classifications of uniformed officer personnel in the government
service.
(a) The term "regular government officer or employee" includes uniformed officers
of the regular service on active duty who do not qualify as special government
employees and uniformed officers in the reserve voluntarily on active duty who
do not qualify as special government employees. Retired regular officers, retired
reserve officers and reserve officers not on active duty do not become regular
government officers or employees solely because of such officer status. They
may, however, be performing government duties as civilians that bring them
within the scope of this classification. Enlisted personnel of the uniformed
services are not regular government officers or employees.
(b) The term "special government employee" includes uniformed officers of the
regular service on active duty whose appointment is for a period not to exceed
13o days during any period of 365 consecutive days; uniformed officers of the
reserve on voluntary active duty whose appointment is for a period not exceed-
ing 13o days out of any period of 365 consecutive days; uniformed reserve officers
on involuntary active duty regardless of the length of time; and reserve officers
on active duty solely for training purposes0 9 Retired regular officers, retired
reserve officers or retired reserve officers not on active duty do not become special
government employees solely because of such officer status. Enlisted personnel
of the uniformed services are not special government employees.
(c) The term "former officers and employees" includes officers of the uniformed
services who formerly were classified as "regular government officers and em-
ployees" or "special government employees" and who have left the government
service; retired regular officers; and reserve officers released from active duty.
Enlisted personnel do not become former government officers or employees on
retirement. A retired reserve officer is not by that fact alone a former govern-
ment officer or employee. The only part of Public Law 87-849 that applies to
"former (government) officers and employees" is section 207, which covers post-
employment restrictions.
(d) Retired officers of the uniformed services not on active duty and who are not
otherwise officers or employees of the government are exempted from the appli-
cation of sections 203 and 205 of the Act.
It can be seen that the only part of the basic conflicts statute that applies to retired
inactive regular officers is section 207 relating to post-employment disqualification.
If Public Law 87-849 had stopped there, much difficulty and discrimination relating
" Reserve officers may be classified as regular government officers or employees if their civilian occupa-
tion with the government gives them that status.
2zI
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to retired regular officers could have been avoided. But Congress left standing
two of the old penal conflicts statutes to the extent that they apply to retired regular
officers of the armed services. Section 281 of title eighteen'00 permanently prohibits
a retired regular officer from receiving or agreeing to receive any compensation for
representing any person in the sale of anything to the government through the
department in whose service he holds retired status. Section 283 of title eighteen 0 1
imposes a two-year post-retirement ban on a retired regular officer acting as
agent or attorney in the prosecution of any claim against the government if the
claim involves the department in which he holds retired status or if it pertains to
any subject matter with which he was directly connected while on active duty. This
section also forbids giving any assistance in the prosecution of such claims and its
sanctions apply whether or not compensation is received.
Old section 281 with its department-wide ban on representational selling activity
goes far beyond the restraint philosophy of new section 207, and is, therefore,
discriminatory. The prohibition of old section 283 is much more adequately
covered in new section 207 so that retention of the old section was unnecessary.
Sections 28i and 283 serve no useful purpose and should be repealed in their
entirety.
Public Law 87-777,102 enacted just prior to Public Law 87-849, repealed a long-
standing discriminatory provision 03 which prohibited retired regular Navy and
regular Marine officers from selling or contracting for themselves or others with the
Department of the Navy any time following their retirement, subject to forfeiture
of retirement pay while so engaged. In its stead was substituted a revision of old
section 59c of tide five'04 which places all retired regular officers of the uniformed
services' 05 on an even level and prohibits them for a period of three years after
retirement from engaging in selling, °0 contracting or negotiating the sale of war
materials or supplies on behalf of themselves or others to any agency of the Depart-
ment of Defense, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health
Service. 0 7  The penalty for violation of this law is withholding of retirement pay
100 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958).
101 18 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
102 76 Stat. 777, 37 U.S.C. § 8oc (Supp. IV, x962).
10 io U.S.C. § 6112(a) (1958). This law was discriminatory because it had no similar application
to retired Army or Air Force officers.
104 67 Stat. 437 (i953), 5 U.S.C. § 59(c) (1958).
.. This classification covers retired officers of the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Marine
Corps, Regular Air Force, Regular Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service.
100 "Selling" is defined by the statute to mean:
i. Signing a bid, proposal, or contract.
2. Negotiating a contract.
3. Contacting an officer or employee of any of the foregoing departments or agencies for the purpose of:
obtaining or negotiating contracts, negotiating or discussing changes in specifications, price, cost
allowances, or other terms of a contract, or settling disputes concerning performance of a contract.
4. Any other liaison activity with a view toward the ultimate consummation of a sale even though the
actual contract therefor is subsequently negotiated by another person.
107 The prohibition is all inclusive and applies, for example, to a retired regular Navy officer who
within three years of retirement negotiates a contract for war materials with the Coast and Geodetic
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during the entire performance of any contract concerning which the breach
occurred. 1
08
Retired regular officers of the armed services are required to file a statement of
employment with the department from which they have retired within thirty days
after retirement. This form must be kept up to date by revisions when necessary. 0 9
There is one other restriction on retired regular officers of the uniformed
services that is indirectly related to conflict of interest. They are not allowed to
receive total compensation from the government in excess of Sxo,ooo per year." 0
This means that their retirement pay plus any salary they receive from the govern-
ment cannot exceed $ioooo annually. The effect of this provision is virtually to
deny the services of retired uniformed officers to the government, and to restrict even
further their post-employment opportunities."'
The special limitations on the post-retirement activities of retired regular officers
seem unduly harsh. The extent of the restrictions on selling activity is not con-
sistent among the various statutes, and there is a wide area of uncertainty as to the
interpretation of the word "selling" as it may apply to any particular set of facts.
Some of the prohibitions regarding representation by retired regular officers are
plainly unnecessary. Restraints on post-retirement activities of retired regular officers
are so severe and uncertain, that the recruitment of able officers into the armed
services is being seriously hampered. It is to be hoped that Congress will soon
correct some of these glaring inequities by repealing sections 281 and 283 of tide
eighteen altogether and by bringing the post-retirement limitations that apply
to retired regular officers more closely into line with the corresponding restrictions
applied to other federal officers and employees.
CONCLUSIONS
Public Law 87-849 and its associated regulations represent a significant advance
in the development of the law of conflict of interest at the federal government level.
Survey. Note that the term "war materials and supplies" is very broad and could be interpreted to
mean almost any kind of goods. Pub. L. No. 87-777 also perpetuated a restriction that was formerly found
in io U.S.C. § 6112(b) (958) applying only to regular Naval and Marine officers who have not yet
retired. The subsection prohibits such regular officers from being employed by any person furnishing
war materials and supplies to the government, and permits withholding of their service pay during such
period, 37 U.S.C. § 8os(b) (Supp. IV, x962). The abuse covered by this provision is now more ade-
quately dealt with by § 2o9 of Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1125 (1962), i8 U.S.C.A. § 2o9 (Supp. 1963).
108 42 DEcs. Comp. GEN. 32 (1962). The Comptroller General is usually the arbiter of disputes
arising under this statute because claims for retirement pay withheld at the institgation of any government
agency must be made to him.
"' Department of Defense Directive 5500.7, 28 Fed. Reg. 5666 (1963).
11047 Star. 4o6 (932), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 59(a) (1958). The provisions of this statute have
been side-stepped in some special cases which have drawn the ire of congressional committees. See
Report of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Contracting Out Government Responsi-
bility for Administrative, Management and Other Services, H.R. REP. No. 688, 86th Cong., ist Sess.
(959).
... There is also a dual payment provision that applies to all employees of the federal government,
uniformed officers and civilian, which prohibits them from holding any other federal office for which
compensation is paid if they presently hold a government position for which the annual compensation
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Many state and local governments are following the lead of Washington in en-
forcing a stricter code of ethics. It is ardently to be hoped that this upsurge in
business morality will spread to private commercial enterprise.
During this important stage of development, it is highly desirable that the law
evolve at a relatively uniform pace across the broad front of the entire government.
There is no justification for saying that the Secretary of the Army should observe
a higher standard of ethics than a Senator. Nor is there any reason for treating
the post-employment situation of a retired Civil Service employee differently from
that of a retired regular officer of the armed services." 2 If ex parte communications
are improper in one agency, they are wrong in all agencies that conduct adjudicative
proceedings. There is no reason why the Federal Procurement Regulation that
applies to non-defense agencies should not incorporate the same restraints against
conflicts of interest as does the Armed Services Procurement Regulation. These
two regulations can also be utilized to clarify some of the more obscure aspects of the
new basic conflicts statute and to fill in some of its gaps in coverage.
It is often said, and a great body of evidence supports the contention, that
morality cannot be legislated. Ethics are a reflection of moral attitudes. No code
of ethics with respect to conflicts of interest or anything else will really work
unless government officials are afforded a reasonable degree of economic independ
ence. Great strides in this direction have been made in recent years, but the
situation should be kept under close and constant study. Public administration has
become so significant in virtually all areas of endeavor that in the long run we can
afford nothing less than the best.
exceeds $2,500. 50 Stat. 549 (1938), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 62 (i958). The statute primarily affects
civilian employees of the government, but does have some impact on retired regular officers.
.12 A recent opinion by the Court of Claims has advanced a theory on which such a distinction might
be based that is of questionable validity. That court in Hooper v. United States (Ct. Cl. No. 212-61,
January 24, 1964) suggests that the retirement salary of a retired regular officer of the armed services is
"not solely recompense for past services, but a means devised by Congress to assure his availability and
preparedness in future contingencies." Even if this theory is accepted, it would not seem to justify
the severe post-employment restraints that presently apply to retired regular officers.
